SpecFuzz: Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface by Oleksenko, Oleksii et al.
SpecFuzz
Bringing Spectre-type vulnerabilities to the surface
Oleksii Oleksenko†, Bohdan Trach†, Mark Silberstein‡, and Christof Fetzer†
†TU Dresden, ‡ Technion
[Draft version. Subject to change]
Abstract
SpecFuzz is the first tool that enables dynamic testing for
speculative execution vulnerabilities (e.g., Spectre). The key
is the concept of speculation exposure: The program is in-
strumented to simulate speculative execution in software by
forcefully executing the code paths that could be triggered
due to mispredictions, thereby making the speculative mem-
ory accesses visible to integrity checkers. Combined with
the conventional fuzzing techniques, speculation exposure
enables more precise identification of potential vulnerabilities
compared to the state-of-the-art static analyzers.
Our prototype for detecting Spectre V1 vulnerabilities suc-
cessfully identifies all known variations of Spectre V1, and
dramatically reduces the overheads compared to the deployed
Speculative Load Hardening mitigation across the evaluated
applications, reducing the amount of necessary instrumenta-
tion by 99% in some of them.
1 Introduction
Spectre [18, 24, 25, 35] is a class of speculative execution
attacks that poses a significant threat to system security. They
allow an attacker to extract secrets from bug-free programs
by exploiting security flaws in the underlying CPU hardware.
Spectre-type attacks exploit hardware optimizations that al-
low the CPU to execute code out of order. For example, if
an array access is guarded by a bounds check, the CPU may
predict that the check will not fail and start the access specu-
latively, before knowing if it is allowed. If the prediction later
appears to be wrong, the CPU will cancel the architectural
changes caused by the speculation, such as updates to the
CPU registers’ values. However, it will not cleanse some
of the microarchitectural changes, such as the cached data.
The speculative attacks use this property to deduce the values
loaded during the speculation and, thus, bypass the software
defences.
Unlike other speculative execution attacks (Meltdown [27]
and Foreshadow [14]), some variants of Spectre are not ex-
pected to be fixed by hardware vendors [11, 12]. Therefore,
the burden of protecting programs from Spectre lies entirely
on software developers.
Unfortunately, the software tools for mitigating these at-
tacks suffer from either high performance penalty or low pre-
cision. The conservative mitigation techniques [2, 11, 17, 38]
pessimistically instrument every instruction sequence prone
to the speculation such that the speculation is either prevented
or becomes provably benign. Some of these techniques, how-
ever, result in a significant performance overhead, making
the application up to several times slower than the native
version [33].
Another approach is to use static analysis tools [15, 21,
30] to find Spectre gadgets—code patterns that may serve
to mount the attack. Even though they cause much lower
overheads, prior work [23] has shown that such tools may
overlook the gadgets that slightly deviate from those expected
by the analyzer. It renders such mitigation tools ineffective
because even a single missed Spectre gadget may, in the worst
case, allow leakage of the entire application memory space.
In this work, our goal was to attain the performance benefits
of the analysis techniques without confining ourselves to any
specific vulnerability fingerprints. To this end, we harness the
state-of-the-art dynamic bug testing tools, such as fuzzing, to
detect Spectre-type vulnerabilities.
Fuzzing [45] is a well-established technique broadly used
for dynamic testing. The basic idea of fuzzing is simple: We
feed the program with randomized or diversified inputs to find
tests cases that trigger a bug. It is commonly used, for exam-
ple, to detect memory safety violations by combining fuzzing
with memory safety techniques such as Intel MPX [13] or
AddressSanitizer [36].
Fuzzing, however, cannot be applied directly. The primary
challenge we tackle is that speculative execution vulnerabili-
ties are normally undetectable through fuzzing because the
side effects of misspeculation are discarded by the CPU with-
out exposing them to the software. Yet, exactly these side
effects (e.g., a speculative access outside of the array bounds)
make the attacks possible. Therefore, all Spectre-type mem-
ory accesses pass under the radar of memory safety checkers
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and, consequently, under the radar of fuzzing.
To overcome this problem, we introduce the concept of
speculation exposure, the first technique to enable dynamic
testing for Spectre-type vulnerabilities. It leverages software
simulation of the speculative behavior to turn speculative
vulnerabilities into conventional ones and, thus, make them
detectable by integrity checks. The concept is generic and
can be universally applied to different Spectre attacks with
only small modifications.
Speculation exposure consists of three phases executed ev-
ery time we encounter a potentially-vulnerable instruction
sequence: 1© take a checkpoint of the process state, 2© simu-
late the optimization and execute the speculative path, and 3©
rollback the process to the checkpoint and continue normal
execution. This way, we force the application into taking the
control flow path that could be executed due to mispredictions
and all invalid accesses on these paths become visible to the
software integrity checkers.
To showcase the method, we implement SpecFuzz, a tool
for detecting Bounds Check Bypass (BCB) vulnerabilities.
SpecFuzz simulates conditional branch mispredictions by
inverting branch conditions while executing speculative paths.
It detects invalid behavior during the simulation by applying
AddressSanitizer [36].
Our evaluation shows that SpecFuzz is considerably more
effective at finding the vulnerabilities than the existing static
analysis tools. In total, it detected 2055 unique invalid specu-
lative accesses across the six libraries we tested, while Spectre
1 Scanner [15]—a static analysis tool—found only 38 BCB in-
stances. Furthermore, the additional information we received
from the dynamic testing allowed us to prune most of the
found vulnerabilities as they appeared to be not realistically
exploitable. This left us with only 10 branches that actually
required a patch (none of them were detected by the scanner).
Finding so few instances was surprising to us, and it demon-
strated that BCB vulnerabilities are much less widespread
than it is presently believed. It also showed how superfluous
the conservative defences against BCB are. For example,
Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) [2], instrumented 4382
branches across the tested libraries, while SpecFuzz found
only 10 vulnerabilities, meaning that 99% of the SLH instru-
mentation was probably not necessary (although we cannot
guarantee it, see next). Because of that, the patches produced
based on the fuzzing results have a much lower overhead
compared to the full-program instrumentation: In our exper-
iments, SLH caused 80% slowdown on average, whereas
SpecFuzz-based patches had 12% in the worst case.
These performance benefits, however, come at the cost of
relaxed security guarantees compared to conservative protec-
tion. First, reaching complete coverage with fuzzing is virtu-
ally impossible and, although we strove to have a high cov-
erage, it is still possible that some speculative out-of-bounds
accesses were not triggered during the experiments. Second,
our current implementation of SpecFuzz does not simulate
branch misprediction precisely: It does not support nested
mispredictions, and it cannot proceed with speculation after
encountering an error. These are, however, implementation
issues and they can be fixed in future without redesigning the
tool.
Our contributions include:
• Speculation exposure, a generic simulation method for
Spectre-type vulnerabilities that makes them detectable
through conventional dynamic testing techniques.
• SpecFuzz, an implementation of the method applied to
detection of Bounds Check Bypass vulnerabilities.
• An analysis technique for processing and ranking the
results of dynamic testing with SpecFuzz.
• Evaluation of SpecFuzz on a set of popular libraries and
comparison with two existing BCB mitigation mecha-
nisms: a conservative technique Speculative Load Hard-
ening and a static analysis tool Spectre 1 Scanner.
To show how SpecFuzz works in practice, we addi-
tionally provide a demo containing 15 BCB variants [24]
that are compiled with SpecFuzz. Find the demo un-
der: https://cloud.docker.com/repository/docker/
tudinfse/specfuzz_demo
2 Background
2.1 Speculative Execution
In modern processors, execution of a single instruction re-
quires several stages, such as fetching, decoding, and reading.
To improve performance, nearly all modern CPUs execute
them in a pipelined fashion: When one instruction passes a
stage, the next instruction can enter the stage without waiting
for the first one to pass all the following stages. This allows
for much higher levels of instruction parallelism and for better
utilization of the hardware resources.
However, in certain situations—called hazards—it is not
possible to start executing the next instruction immediately. A
hazard may happen in three cases: a structural hazard appears
when there are no available execution units, a data hazards—
when there is a data dependency between the instructions, and
control hazard—when the first instruction modifies the control
flow (e.g., at a conditional branch) and the CPU does not know
what instruction will run next. As the hazards are stalling the
CPU, they can significantly reduce its performance.
To deal with the control hazards (and sometimes, with data
hazards), modern CPUs try to predict the outcome of the
situation and start speculatively executing the instructions
assumed next. For example, when the CPU encounters an
indirect jump, it predicts the jump target based on the history
of recently used targets and redirects the control flow to it.
While the CPU does not know if the prediction was correct,
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1 i = input[0];
2 if (i < size) {
3 secret = foo[i];
4 baz = bar[secret]; }
Figure 1: Example of a potential Bounds Check Bypass vul-
nerability.
it keeps track of the speculative instructions in a so-called
Reorder Buffer (ROB). The results of these instructions are
temporarily kept in internal buffers or registers and are ar-
chitecturally invisible (i.e., the software do not have access
to them). Eventually, the CPU resolves the hazard and, de-
pending on the outcome, either commits the results to the
architectural state or discards them.
2.2 Speculative Attacks
In a speculative attack, the attacker intentionally forces the
CPU into making a wrong prediction and speculatively ex-
ecuting a wrong control flow path. Because taking the path
violates the application semantics, it may bypass security
checks within the application. Moreover, if any exceptions
should appear on the speculative path, they will be handled
only during the retirement stage.
For a long time, this behavior was considered safe because
the CPU never commits the results of a wrong speculation.
However, as it was discovered in Spectre [24] and Melt-
down [27] attacks, the traces of the speculative execution
are visible on the microarchitectural level. For example, the
data loaded on the speculative path will not show up in the
CPU registers, but will be cached in the CPU caches. The
attacker can later launch a side-channel attack [40,44] to read
the traces and, based on them, retrieve the data used on the
speculative path.
2.3 Bounds Check Bypass
In this paper, we will showcase our dynamic testing approach
on one of the speculative attacks, namely Bounds Check By-
pass (BCB, also called Spectre V1) [24]. In essence, Bounds
Check Bypass is a conventional out-of-bounds memory ac-
cess (e.g., buffer overflow) that happens during speculative
executions because of a mispredicted conditional branch.
Consider the code snippet in Figure 1: Without the bounds
check on line 2, an adversary with control over the input can
force the load on line 3 to read from any address, including
those beyond the bounds of the array foo. Normally, vulnera-
bilities of this type are prevented by adding a bounds checks
before the memory access, such as the one on line 2. How-
ever, the adversary can train the branch predictor to anticipate
that the check will pass. Then, the CPU will start specula-
tively executing lines 3 and 4 even if the index i is out of the
array bounds. Later, it will find out that the prediction was
Figure 2: Example of speculative execution. Due to a mis-
prediction, the program executes basic blocks BB3 and BB4,
then detects the mistake, discards the results, and continues
execution starting from BB2.
wrong and discard the speculated load, but its cache traces
will stay. The adversary can access the traces by launching a
side-channel attack and, hence, find out the secret value.
3 Speculation Exposure
Speculative vulnerabilities are notoriously hard to find be-
cause hardware strives to hide the effects of speculative ex-
ecution from software, making it impossible to detect such
vulnerabilities with conventional testing methods. In this
paper, we approach the problem by simulating the unsafe
hardware optimization in software to uncover the speculative
vulnerabilities.
To understand how we construct the simulation, first con-
sider how speculative execution is implemented in hard-
ware (§2.1). When a hazard appears (e.g., at a conditional or
an indirect jump), the CPU 1© makes a prediction on its out-
come, 2© executes the predicted path while keeping the results
in a temporary storage, 3© eventually eliminates the hazard
and either commits the results (correct prediction) or discards
them (wrong prediction), and proceeds with the correct path.
For example, in Figure 2, the CPU might make a wrong
prediction that BB1 (Basic Block 1) will proceed into BB3.
Then, it will start executing BB3, BB4, and further. When the
hazard is eliminated, the CPU determines that the prediction
was wrong and discards all changes made by the speculated
instructions. Afterward, it proceeds to execute the correct
path starting from BB2.
We can simulate this behavior with a "checkpoint-
mispredict-rollback" scheme: At a potential hazard, we take
a checkpoint of the current process state. Then, we diverge
the control flow into a wrong (mispredicted) path and start
executing it. When the maximal possible length of specu-
lative execution is reached or if we encounter a serializing
instruction, we rollback to the checkpoint and proceed with
normal execution. The pattern can be applied to data hazards
too: Instead of diverging the control flow, we would replace a
memory/register value with a mispredicted one.
This basic mechanism simulates the worst case scenario
with a CPU that always makes a wrong prediction and always
speculates to the longest possible depth. Such a pessimistic
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approach makes the testing results universally applicable to
any CPU model and any execution conditions. Moreover, it
also covers all possible combinations of correct and incorrect
predictions that could happen at runtime.
Checkpointing. For storing the process state, we could use
any of the existing checkpointing mechanisms, ranging from
full-process checkpoint (e.g., CRIU [1]) to transactional mem-
ory techniques (e.g., Intel TSX [13]), although it is preferable
to use light-weight, low-overhead mechanisms to reduce the
testing time. We describe the checkpointing mechanism used
in our implementation in §4.2.
Simulating misprediction. To simulate misprediction, we
instrument the basic blocks in a way that will force control
flow to enter the paths that the CPU would otherwise take
speculatively. The nature of instrumentation would depend on
the exact type of speculative execution attack being simulated.
Terminating simulation. The final question is, when do we
terminate the simulation? In real hardware, the termination
happens in the following cases:
• At serializing instructions (e.g., LFENCE, CPUID).
• When the maximum speculation depth is reached.
The first case is straightforward: We execute a rollback
every time when we encounter a serialization instruction.
For the second case, we assume that the speculation depth
is limited by the size of Reorder Buffer (ROB) as the specula-
tion can proceed only as long as there is empty space in ROB.
In modern CPUs, ROBs can fit no more than 250 microop-
erations (µops) (the largest we know is 224 entries, in Intel
Skylake architecture). Because software does not have access
to µop counters, we have to fall back to estimating the size as
250 machine instructions, which are easier to count. It is an
overestimation because normally one instruction maps to at
least one µop1.
3.1 Applying Simulation to Spectre Attacks
The simulation mechanism will depend on the specific vulner-
ability that we want to simulate. While we explain the instru-
mentation we have implemented for Branch Check Bypass in
the later sections, below we give an overview of instrumenta-
tion that can be used for other Spectre-type attacks.
Branch Target Injection [24] is a Spectre variant targeting
speculation at indirect jumps. When an indirect jump instruc-
tion is executed, the CPU speculates the jump target using the
branch predictor without waiting for the actual target address
computation to finish. The attacker can exploit this behavior
by training the branch predictor to execute jump to a code
snippet that would leak program data via a side channel.
1The only exception is µops fusion, when CPU merges several instructions
into one. However, it is a rare event that should not compromise the security
guarantees.
1
2
3
4 if x < array_size:
5
6 result = array[x]
7 ...
8
9
(a) Native version
checkpoint()
if x >= array_size:
goto skip_branch
if x < array_size
skip_branch:
result = array[x]
...
if max_depth_reached():
rollback() // to line 4
(b) Simulation of conditional branch
misprediction
Figure 3: Example of the SpecFuzz instrumentation
SpecFuzz can be modified to simulate BTI by maintain-
ing a software history buffer for every indirect branch in the
application. Then, at an indirect branch, SpecFuzz would 1)
record the current branch target into the history buffer and 2)
run a simulation for every previously recorded target. This
approach works, however, under the assumption that attacker
can train the branch predictor only by providing data to the
application and cannot inject arbitrary targets into the IBTB
from another application on the same core.
Return Address Misprediction [25,29] attack is a variant of
Branch Target Injection. The CPU maintains a small number
of most recently used return addresses in a dedicated cache,
pushing the return address into this cache on each call instruc-
tion and popping it from the cache on each return instruction.
When this cache becomes empty, the CPU will speculate the
return address using the indirect Branch Target Buffer. To
simulate this vulnerability, SpecFuzz can instrument call and
return instructions to, correspondingly, increment and decre-
ment a counter, jumping to an address from history buffer on
return addresses with negative or zero counter value.
Speculative Store Bypass. [18] is a microarchitectural vul-
nerability caused by CPU ignoring the potential dependencies
between load and store instructions during speculation. When
a store operation is delayed, subsequent load from the same
address may speculatively reuse to old value from the cache.
To simulate this attack, SpecFuzz could be extended to start a
simulation before every basic block that contains a write to
memory. Then, we would skip the store during the simulation,
but execute it after the rollback. If a basic block contains
several stores, then we split it and execute the simulation for
every store.
4 SpecFuzz: Exposure of Bounds Check
Bypass
To showcase our approach on a specific vulnerability class,
we develop a tool for simulating and detecting Bounds Check
Bypass (BCB) [24]. We call the tool SpecFuzz.
BCB in its core contains a speculative out-of-bounds ac-
cess caused by a misprediction of a conditional jump target
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Figure 4: Simulation of conditional branch mispredictions: The terminator condition is replaced by an inverse one. When the
simulation is ended, the program returns to the normal flow.
(see §2.3). To detect the access, we have to implement two
components: a simulation of the misprediction (§3) and a
mechanism for detecting invalid memory accesses during the
speculation. The latter is relatively straightforward as we
can use one of many existing memory safety techniques; in
SpecFuzz, we used AddressSanitizer [36]. To implement the
former, though, we need a custom technique.
To simulate conditional branch mispredictions, we create
a modified (instrumented) version of the application which
executes not only the normal control flow but also the paths
that could be taken as a result of mispredictions. Consider the
example on Figure 3. Before the conditional branch (line 4),
we insert a call to a checkpointing function (line 1) that stores
the current process state and initializes simulation. Then, we
simulate a misprediction by inserting a branch statement with
an inverted condition (line 2) and a jump into the body of the
conditional block, thus skipping the original branch (line 3).
We proceed with the execution until reaching a terminating
condition: either the maximum speculation depth (line 8) or a
serializing instruction (not present in the example). After that,
we restore the process state to the previous checkpoint (line
9) and redirect the execution to the original branch statement.
We implement this design as a combination of an
LLVM [26] backend pass for the x86 architecture and a run-
time library.
4.1 Simulating Branch Misprediction
SpecFuzz simulates mispredictions by forcing the application
into taking a wrong branch at every conditional jump. We im-
plement this behavior by replacing all conditional terminators
in the program with the ones that have an inverted condition
(see Figure 4). Now, when the original basic block (BB)
would proceed into the successor S1, the modified terminator
diverges the control flow into S2. The original terminator
is moved into a separate BB, and the control flow returns
to normal execution by rolling back into this BB after the
simulation.
As a result, every time the program reaches this BB, it first
executes the simulated path, then rolls back to the BB and con-
tinues with normal execution. We apply this instrumentation
to all conditional branches.
4.2 Saving and Restoring Process State
The main requirement to the rollback mechanism used in
SpecFuzz was to have low performance impact so that the
testing time is kept short. To this end, we implemented a light-
weight in-application mechanism that snapshots the CPU state
before the simulation and records the memory changes during
the simulation.
To store the CPU state, we add a call to the checkpointing
function before every conditional jump. The function takes a
snapshot of the register values (including GPRs, flags, SIMD,
floating-point registers, etc.) and stores it into memory. Dur-
ing the rollback, we restore the register values based on the
snapshot. The function also stores the address of the original
conditional jump (i.e., original terminator) that we later use
as a rollback address.
We could apply a similar mechanism to save the memory
state, but this would have an unacceptable performance cost,
especially considering that we would have to dump memory
contents at every conditional jump. Instead, we log all writes
to memory during the simulation. Before every instruction
that modifies memory (e.g., mov, push, call), we store the
address it modifies and its previous value. Then, to do a
rollback, we go through the changes in the reverse order and
restore the old values.
4.3 Terminating Simulation
As discussed in §3, we terminate the simulation either if we
encounter a serializing event or when the maximum depth of
speculation is reached.
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Figure 5: The workflow of testing an application with SpecFuzz.
To implement the first case, we simply invoke the rollback
function before every serializing instruction. As serializing,
we consider the following instructions:
• The instructions listed as serializing in the Intel docu-
mentation [13], such as LFENCE or CPUID.
• System calls. We assume that executing any system
call takes longer than the maximum possible duration of
speculative execution.
• External function calls. By the virtue of being imple-
mented as a compiler pass, SpecFuzz cannot correctly
run the simulation beyond the instrumented code. There-
fore, we have to consider all calls to external functions
as serialization points, even though it is not necessarily
a correct behavior. In §7, we discuss a potential solution
to this problem.
For the second case, we count instructions at runtime. For
this, we keep a global instruction counter and set it to zero
when a simulation begins. At the beginning of every basic
block, we add its length to the counter. (We know the length
at compile time because SpecFuzz is a backend pass). When
the counter value reaches 250 (maximum possible speculation
depth, see §3), we invoke the rollback function.
4.4 Handling errors
Finally, with the simulation mechanism at hand, we have to
correctly respond to detections of out-of-bounds accesses or
to other error conditions that appear during the simulation.
In contrast to normal, nonspeculative execution, the process
does not crash if an error happens during the speculation.
Instead, the CPU silences the error by discarding its effects
when the misprediction is detected.
To simulate this behavior in SpecFuzz, we had to adapt
the error response mechanism in AddressSanitizer (we rely
on it for detecting out-of-bounds accesses). Normally, upon
detecting a bounds violation, AddressSanitizer terminates the
application and reports the error. We modified it to instead
record the violation in a log and rollback to the previous
checkpoint2. Accordingly, one test run might detect several
errors. In practice, we observed up to hundreds of errors per
single invocation.
2A more correct response would be to log and continue simulation, al-
though current implementation of SpecFuzz does not yet support it.
Similarly, we have to recover from runtime faults. We
register a custom signal handler that logs and rolls back after
the signals that could be caused by an out-of-bounds access,
such as SIGSEGV and SIGBUS. We also rollback after other
faults (e.g., division by zero), but we do not record them in
the log as they are irrelevant to the BCB vulnerability.
5 Fuzzing with SpecFuzz
Given the simulation technique described in the previous sec-
tion (§4), we can test applications with conventional dynamic
testing methods, such as fuzzing. In our experiments, we used
the workflow in Figure 5.
First, we compile the application under test with Clang
and apply the SpecFuzz pass, thus producing an instrumented
binary that simulates branch mispredictions. Second, we fuzz
the binary. In our experiments, we used HonggFuzz [9], an
evolutionary coverage-driven fuzzer, and we relied on Intel
Processor Trace [22] for measuring code coverage. After
fuzzing, we aggregate the traces and analyze the detected
vulnerabilities.
5.1 Aggregation of results
As a result fuzzing, we get a trace of detected speculative
out-of-bounds accesses. Each entry in the trace has a form of
a tuple:
(Accessed address; Offending instruction; Mispredicted branch)
Usually, the trace is long and may contain up to hundreds
of detections per every test run. This happens because the
simulation forces the application into doing wrong actions,
which frequently leads to errors.
To make the trace usable, we aggregate the results per run
and per instruction. That is, for every test run, we collect all
the addresses that every unique offending instruction accessed
as well as the addresses of branches, mispredictions of which
triggered the execution of this instruction. Appendix A is an
example of what we get from the aggregation.
5.2 Vulnerability analysis
After the aggregation, we have a list of vulnerabilities with an
approximate range of addresses that each of them can access.
As we will see in §6.2, the list may be rather verbose and
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contain up to multiple thousands of vulnerabilities. Yet, we
argue that most of them are not realistically exploitable.
In many cases, the attacker does not have any control over
the accessed address. This could happen, for example, when
the application tries to speculatively dereference a field of an
uninitialized structure. In this case, no matter what input we
provide to the application, the speculative dereference will
always go to the same address. This lack of control shifts the
vulnerability into the category of conventional side-channel
attacks [40, 44] that are less critical than BCB because they
provide less information to the attacker and are harder to
launch. Moreover, the defence strategies for these attacks are
also different from BCB.
We identify these cases by analyzing the aggregated traces.
We estimate the presence of the attacker’s control by compar-
ing the accessed addresses in every run. If a given offending
instruction always accessed the same set of addresses, we
assume that the attacker does not have control over it. Note,
however, that the heuristic is valid only after a large enough
number of test runs.
6 Evaluation
In this section, we try to answer the following questions:
• How effective is SpecFuzz at detecting BCB vulnerabili-
ties?
• Is it better at finding the vulnerabilities than the existing
static analysis tools?
• Does patching based on SpecFuzz results give us a per-
formance improvement compared to full-application pro-
tection?
To put the results into a context, we compare SpecFuzz
to two existing open-source projects: Spectre V1 Scanner
(RH Scanner) [15]—a static analysis tool from RedHat, and
Speculative Load Hardening (SLH) [2]—an LLVM pass that
masks all speculative loads thus providing a conservative
defence against BCB.
Instead of RH Scanner, we could have compared SpecFuzz
with more advanced static analysis tools Respectre [21] and
oo7 [43], but they are not freely available: Respectre is a
commercial product and oo7 is provided only upon request.
We did not manage to get access to oo7 and the comparison
with Respectre is still being arranged with the authors.
Applications. For the evaluation, we tested six commonly
used libraries. The libraries include two cryptographic
functions (AES from libTomCrypt [10] and RSA from
BearSSL [4]), a compression algorithm (Brotli [5]), and
three parsing libraries, JSON (JSMN [6]), HTTP [7], and
YAML [8]. We picked these specific libraries because they
may directly process unsanitized user input from the network,
MSVC RH Scanner SLH SpecFuzz Total
2 12 15 15 15
Table 1: The number of basic BCB variants detected by dif-
ferent mitigation tools.
giving the attacker better chances of controlling memory ac-
cesses within the libraries.
Testbed. We ran all the experiments on a 4-core (8 hyper-
threads) Intel Core i7 CPU operating at 3.4 GHz (Skylake
microarchitecture) with 32 KB L1 and 256 KB L2 private
caches, an 8 MB L3 shared cache, and 32 GB of RAM. The
machine was running Linux kernel 4.16.
6.1 Detection of BCB Gadgets
With the first experiment, we want to show that SpecFuzz is
effective at detecting different variations of BCB. To this end,
we tested 15 sample BCB variants created by Paul Kocher [23]
which represent 15 different ways BCB may occur in C code.
The variants were originally designed to illustrate the short-
comings of the BCB mitigation mechanism in MSVC [30],
but they can serve as a good starting point for evaluating ef-
fectiveness of any BCB detection tool. Note, however, that
the suite is not exhaustive and it does not represent all possi-
ble variants of BCB; rather, it evaluates the basic detection
capabilities of a tool.
The testing results are presented in Table 1. As expected,
the simulation in SpecFuzz works correctly and surfaces all
speculative out-of-bounds accesses, which are then detected
by AddressSanitizer. As of the other tools, the original arti-
cle [23] reported that the MSVC pass detects only 2 variants3.
It happens because it relies on simple pattern matching, that is,
it searches for specific patterns in the binary. Accordingly, if
the vulnerability happens to take a form not envisioned by the
developers, the compiler will not protect it. The same goes for
RH Scanner, although it relies on more generic patterns and
thus, detects more variants. SLH does not attempt to find the
vulnerabilities and instead protects all conditional branches
in the application, which guarantees complete coverage.
6.2 Fuzzing results
Next, we wanted to see how effective SpecFuzz is at detecting
vulnerabilities in the wild. To this end, we fuzzed six real-
world libraries. The fuzzing of each application lasted for 24
hours. Before running each experiment, we fuzzed a native
(i.e., not instrumented) version of the application to create an
initial input corpus. This way, we ensured large coverage (see
§7 for discussion of the coverage issue).
3The result may be outdated. We did not test the newer versions of the
pass and it may have improved since the publication of the article.
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AES RSA Brotli JSMN HTTP YAML Total
SpecFuzz
Total 3 16 1909 17 15 95 2055
Controlled 0 2 980 2 3 25 1012
In C 0 2 52 2 3 19 78
Verified 0 0 6 (3) 2 2 0 10
RH Scanner
Total 0 13 (3 new) 5 1 1 18 38
True positive 0 8 4 1 1 4 18
Controlled 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SLH: instrumented branches 21 175 253 83 452 3398 4382
Table 2: Vulnerabilities found by SpecFuzz, RH Scanner, and the total number of branches instrumented by SLH.
The results are presented in Table 2. The first row (To-
tal) represents the total number of vulnerabilities detected
by SpecFuzz. There is a vast difference between the results,
ranging from almost 2000 vulnerabilities found in Brotli to
only 3 found in the AES code. One reason for it is the code
type: AES and RSA are cryptographic functions that are writ-
ten with side-channel attacks in mind. They strive to avoid
branching on the input, which reduces the opportunities for
BCB. Another factor is the sheer code size: Brotli has ~9000
LOC while JSMN has less than 400 LOC.
For most of the vulnerabilities, however, we did not observe
any correlation between the input and the accessed address,
which puts them into the low-risk category (see §5.2). The
second row (Controlled) is what is left after filtering them
out. The number becomes even lower if we convert them into
locations in the C code (the third row, In C). As SpecFuzz
works with binaries, a single vulnerability in C may be re-
ported several times due to compiler optimizations, such as
loop unrolling.
Finally, we manually checked the results. The fourth row
(Verified) are realistic vulnerabilities that have to be patched.
The difference between the rows 3 and 4 is caused by the fact
that AddressSanitizer does not provide precise information
about the overflows and SpecFuzz sometimes falsely marks
them as Controlled (see §7). In a few cases (in brackets), we
were not able to find out if the attacker has control over the
accessed address.
For comparison, we also tested the applications with RH
Scanner (rows 5 and 6). It detected much fewer vulnerabilities
than SpecFuzz and in none of them the attacker has control
over the accessed address.
Interestingly, RH Scanner found 3 low-risk vulnerabilities
in RSA that were not triggered by fuzzing. After manual
inspection, we found out that SpecFuzz did not detect them
because they require nested misprediction to be triggered,
which our implementation does not yet support.
6.3 Performance impact of the patches
In this experiment, we wanted to see whether patching based
on the fuzzing results gives us better performance compared
to full-application instrumentation, such as the one imple-
mented by SLH. To evaluate it, we manually patched the
vulnerabilities found in the previous experiment. We patched
only the controlled vulnerabilities because we assume that a
vulnerability is not realistically exploitable if the attacker does
not have any control over the accessed address (see §5.2). To
prevent the vulnerabilities, we added an LFENCE instruction
after every risky branch. Then, we measured the runtimes of
the patched applications and compared them to the overheads
of SLH protection. Every measurement was repeated 100
times and then averaged.
The results are presented in Figure 6. As we can see, the
overhead is significantly lower compared to the one introduces
by SLH. In three cases—AES, RSA, and the YAML parser—
no patch was necessary as we did not find any controllable
vulnerabilities. In the other cases, the patches introduced only
up to 12% overhead.
Such a drastic difference stems from the fact that we patch
only a small subset of the branches in the program. If we
look at the total numbers (Table 2), SLH instrumented 4382
branches across all the libraries, while SpecFuzz allowed us
to reduces the number to only 10 realistic vulnerabilities.
One interesting outlier is JSMN which experienced ~500%
slowdown with SLH. The outlier is caused by an extremely
high density of branches in the application (approximately
one branch executed every cycle) and, thus, high reliance
on branch prediction to efficiently utilize instruction paral-
lelism. SLH effectively disables this optimization and makes
the execution much more sequential. At the same time, Spec-
Fuzz found only two high-risk vulnerabilities in JSMN and
patching them introduced only ~1% slowdown.
Note, however, that the results of this experiment mainly
have an illustrative purpose. Because SpecFuzz and SLH
represent different classes of defence tools, they have differ-
ent security guarantees and their cost cannot be compared
directly. While SLH is a conservative technique that guaran-
tees complete absence of unsafe speculative loads, SpecFuzz
is a testing tool that may miss certain vulnerabilities (see
§7). Accordingly, they should be applied in different situa-
tions: SLH—when security is critical, and SpecFuzz—when
performance is the first priority.
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Figure 6: Performance overheads of the patches based on SpecFuzz compared to the slowdown introduced by SLH.
1 #define bstr_ptr(X) ( ((*(X)).realptr == NULL) \
2 ? ((unsigned char *)(X) + sizeof(bstr)) \
3 : (unsigned char *)(*(X)).realptr )
4 ...
5 if (b == NULL) return NULL;
6 return bstr_util_memdup_to_c(bstr_ptr(b), bstr_len(b));
Figure 7: Example of a low-risk speculative out-of-bounds
access in libHTP.
6.4 Case Study: libHTP
To showcase the fuzzing process on a specific example, this
section will present the procedure of fuzzing an HTTP parsing
library libHTP [7] and the vulnerabilities that we found in it.
We will also examine one realistic and potentially exploitable
vulnerability that SpecFuzz discovered in the library.
We picked libHTP as a case study because it is a security-
critical library that could be used in a wide spectrum of web
applications and a flaw in libHTP can undermine the security
of any project that relies on it. Moreover, it is a security-
aware parser, regularly tested and fuzzed for traditional bugs
(e.g., memory safety violations), which makes it unlikely to
be exploitable through conventional methods.
In this experiment, we built the library with our modified
compiler and ran the fuzzers available in the project’s repos-
itory. As previously, we used HonggFuzz [9] and ran the
experiment for 24 hours. Thanks to the sample inputs shipped
with the project, the coverage was large from the very begin-
ning.
Fuzzing results. In total, SpecFuzz detected 3322 unique
speculative out-of-bounds accesses. Most of them are low-
risk bounds violations in which the attacker cannot control the
accessed address. One such example is presented in Figure 7.
Here, the CPU might mispredict the branch on line 5 and
execute the dereference on line 1 (i.e., ((*(X)).realptr)
even though the pointer b is NULL. The invalid address will
be always to the same address, which is why we consider this
vulnerability benign.
Using the analysis mechanism presented in §5.2, we auto-
matically filtered these cases out. It reduced the number to
148 locations in binary or to 99 in C. The number of code
locations is smaller because one line in C can be compiled
1 size_t i = 0;
2 while (i < len) {
3 data[i] = tolower(data[i]);
4 i++;
5 }
Figure 8: Example of a vulnerability mistakenly labeled as
controllable.
into several locations in binary (e.g., due to loop unrolling)
and a single vulnerability will appear in several places.
Yet, even 99 is not the final number. As described in §7, the
automatic analysis sometimes mistakenly marks a vulnerabil-
ity as controllable. For example, in Figure 8, SpecFuzz detects
an out-of-bounds access on line 3 (data[i]). A mispredic-
tion of the while condition (line 2) may cause a speculative
execution of a few more loop iterations than necessary, lead-
ing to accesses to the addresses beyond the array’s end. The
size of the array may differ from one input to another and the
overflow addresses will also differ. This leads the analysis
tool into falsely marking the vulnerability as controllable.
Found vulnerabilities. After we manual inspected the code
(approximately 2 hours worth of work) and removed these
false labelings, we were left out with only 3 controllable
vulnerabilities4. One of them (see Figure 9) is realistically
exploitable if the attacker can accurately monitor the cache
state. Here, the function base64_decode_single decodes a
Base64 encoded symbol by looking it up in a table of precom-
puted values (array decoding, lines 2–3). Before fetching the
decoded symbol, the function checks the value for over- and
underflows. The attacker can bypass the check by training the
branch predictor and, thus, triggering a speculative overread
on line 7.
There are two properties of the code snippet that make the
vulnerability realistically exploitable. First, the attacker has
complete control over the accessed address because the array
index (value_in) is a part of the HTTP request, that is, a part
of the program input. Second, the fetched value is further
used for defining the control flow of the program (see the
comparison on line 16), which allows the attacker to infer a
4The vulnerabilities were submitted to the library developers and are
currently under review.
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1 int base64_decode_single(signed char value_in) {
2 static signed char decoding[] =
3 {62, -1, ...}; // 80 elements
4 value_in -= 43;
5 if ((value_in < 0) || (value_in > decoding_size - 1))
6 return -1;
7 return decoding[(int) value_in];
8 }
9 ...
10 int htp_base64_decode(const void *code_in, ...) {
11 signed char fragment;
12 ...
13 do {
14 ...
15 fragment = htp_base64_decode_single(*code_in++);
16 } while (fragment < 0);
17 ...}
Figure 9: A realistic BCB vulnerability in the Base64 decod-
ing function that was found by SpecFuzz.
part of the value (specifically, its sign) by observing the cache
state.
The attacker could execute the attack as follows. She begins
by sending a probing message to find out which cache line
the first element of the array decoding uses. Then, she sends
a valid message to train the branch predictor on predicting
the bounds check (line 5) as true. Finally, she resets the
cache state (e.g., flushes the cache) and sends a message that
contains a symbol that triggers an overread, followed by a
symbol that triggers a read from the first array element. If
the read value is negative, the loop will do one more iteration,
execute the second read, and the attacker will see a change in
the state of the corresponding cache line. Otherwise, the loop
will be terminated and the state will not change.
In summary, this vulnerability is a speculative buffer over-
read, which allows reading data within the range of 175 bytes
beyond the bounds of the array decoding and leaks the sign
of the byte it reads.
The other two vulnerabilities are less realistic as they re-
quire the application to misuse the library’s interface. Still,
it is better to protect them, especially considering the low
runtime cost of the patch (see next).
Patch. To patch the vulnerabilities, we added an LFENCE
instruction before every potentially unsafe load. According to
our measurements, the patch changed the request processing
time by 6.5%, from 920 milliseconds to 980 milliseconds
(averaged over 10M requests). For comparison, applying
SLH changed the time by 9.7%, to 1010 milliseconds.
7 Limitations
In this section, we discuss the limitations of SpecFuzz that
we did not envision (or underestimated) while designing the
tool. All of them, however, are only implementation flaws
and can be fixed in the future without redesigning the system.
Nested misprediction. One important feature that our im-
plementation does not yet support is simulation of nested
mispredictions, that is, simulation of the situations when a
branch is mispredicted while speculative execution is already
running. As the evaluation has shown (§6.1), some vulnera-
bilities indeed require misprediction of multiple branches in
a row to get triggered, although this appears infrequently.
To implement the nested simulation, we would have to
maintain a stack of checkpoints instead of a single check-
point: Every time we start a new simulation, we push the
checkpoint on the stack, and every rollback restores the top-
most checkpoint. We plan to implement this feature in the
future.
Mislabeling due to incomplete information. While doing
the evaluation, we discovered that our vulnerability analysis
technique (see §5.2) sometimes gives a false result and mis-
takenly labels an uncontrolled vulnerability as a controlled
one. It is not a big problem because the cost of patching is
generally low, but it may introduce unnecessary overhead.
The reason for the mislabeling is as follows. At a detected
bounds violation, AddressSanitizer reports only the accessed
address and not the distance between the address and the ref-
erent object bounds (e.g., buffer overflow size). Therefore,
if the object size differs among the test runs, the accessed
address will also be different, even if the distance is the same.
And because now the same instruction accesses different ad-
dresses for different inputs, the analysis falsely labels it as a
controllable vulnerability.
For example, one common case of mislabeling that we
encountered is off-by-one accesses. If an array is read in a
loop, our simulation will force the loop to take a few addi-
tional iterations and read a few elements beyond the array’s
bound. Here, the attacker has no control over the accessed
addresses, but if the array size differs from one test run to
another, the addresses accessed in these extra iterations will
also be different. The analysis would mark this vulnerability
as controllable.
So far, we handle these cases by manually analyzing the
code. A better solution would be to use a more complete
memory safety technique (e.g., Intel MPX [13]) that maintains
metadata about referent objects. That would allow us to filter
by changes in the distance to the object bound instead of
changes in the accessed address. Unfortunately, none of such
techniques is supported by Clang out-of-the-box. To resolve
this issue, we would have to implement the support or migrate
SpecFuzz to another compiler.
Mislabeling due to masking. Mislabeling may also happen
if two or more transient out-of-bounds accesses happen in
a row. In the current implementation, SpecFuzz rolls back
immediately upon detection of an out-of-bounds access or
after receiving a fault. Real hardware, however, does not
behave this way and instead proceeds with the speculative
execution.
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This discrepancy between the simulation and the real be-
havior may lead to a wrong classification of a vulnerability if
an uncontrolled access is followed by a controlled one. For
example, if a null dereference precedes a controlled buffer
overflow, the simulation will always rollback at the derefer-
ence and the overflow will never be triggered. Accordingly,
the traces will show that misprediction of this branch always
causes an access to the same address (i.e., to 0), and the
vulnerability will be mistakenly labeled as uncontrolled.
This issue can be fixed by continuing the simulation (in-
stead of rolling back) after recording the error. This, however,
would often cause recursive faults, and our current implemen-
tation cannot yet handle them properly.
Fuzzing coverage. In our evaluation, we used IPT [22] for
measuring coverage. The simulation of mispredictions, how-
ever, makes the measurement artificially inflated because it
adds the speculative paths that do not belong to normal pro-
gram execution. Currently, to compensate this effect, we run
a preliminary fuzzing round with noninstrumented binary that
creates an initial extensive input corpus. In the future, we
could implement a custom coverage mechanism that would
ignore the simulation.
Binary instrumentation. Instead of creating a compiler pass,
we could have implemented SpecFuzz as a binary instrumen-
tation (e.g., with PIN [28]). This would allow us to patch
binaries directly, without having to traverse the vulnerability
back to the source code, thus making the patching process
simpler and, in some cases, the patches would introduce less
overhead. Moreover, by using this approach we would be able
to correctly support dynamic linking and would not require ac-
cess to the source code. However, the binary instrumentation
tools are normally heavy-weight and it would considerably
increase the time required for testing.
8 Related Work
Finally, let us take a look at the existing alternatives to Spec-
Fuzz. Essentially, BCB is a combination of three vulnerabil-
ities: a conditional branch misprediction, a memory safety
violation, and a side-channel leakage. Accordingly, there
are three types of defences that eliminate at least one of the
vulnerabilities.
8.1 Preventing unsafe speculation
The most radical solution is to disable branch prediction en-
tirely [3], although not all processors support it. Alternatively,
the speculation can be disabled on a per-branch basis by
adding serialising instructions, such as LFENCE on Intel CPUs
or DSBSY on ARM. This approach, however, makes the effec-
tiveness of the CPU utilization much lower and causes a large
slowdown, over 400% in certain cases [33].
A more effective conservative defence technique is to add
a data dependency between the conditional branch and the
potentially invalid memory access. This way, most of the
instructions can benefit from branch prediction and only the
memory accesses are delayed. This approach is used, for
example, in Speculative Load Hardening [2]. Although it
provides a performance improvement over full serialization,
the performance overhead is still considerable.
To avoid the high performance cost, we could patch only
those vulnerabilities that seem to be exploitable. This is the
idea behind the static analysis tools like Spectre 1 Scanner
from RedHat [15] and MSCV Spectre 1 pass [30]. They
analyse the binary and search for the instruction sequences
that resemble a BCB vulnerability. Usually, they are searching
for a variation of the pattern branch->load->load/write.
However, using this pattern in a generic form would lead to
marking all the branches as vulnerable, which is counter to
the goal of the analysis. Therefore, most of the tools rely
on specific variants of the pattern. It makes them inherently
incomplete and restricted to the variants envisioned by the
tool developers.
A more advanced analysis technique is used in oo7 [43]. It
relies on static taint analysis to detect the memory accesses
that are dependent on the program input. (This is the same cri-
teria that we used to identify low-risk vulnerabilities.) Specif-
ically, oo7 searches for the following pattern: A conditional
branch with a condition dependent on the input (i.e., tainted)
is followed by a load dependent on the condition, followed
by memory access dependent on the load. Even though this
approach is more reliable and generic than the simple pattern-
matching techniques, it is affected by the inherent problems
of static taint analysis. Namely, limited analysis depth may
cause false positives and overtainting causes false negatives.
Respectre [21] is another analysis tool that claims to have
better coverage than the existing alternatives. However, it is a
commercial product and we can neither verify the claims nor
compare it to SpecFuzz.
8.2 Preventing memory safety violations
Classical memory safety techniques (e.g., Intel MPX [13],
SoftBound [31]) do not protect from BCB as the bounds
checks they add can be mispredicted. Yet, they can be
retrofitted to disable unsafe accesses even in the speculated
paths.
A variant of this approach—pointer clipping—is now used
in JavaScript engines [42] where, before accessing an array
element, the index is masked with the array size. Because
masking is an arithmetic operation, it does not create a control
hazard and is not predicted by the CPU. However, this defence
is vulnerable to the attacks where the data type is mispredicted
and a wrong mask is used [20].
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8.3 Preventing side channels
Another approach is to allow the transient accesses, but elim-
inate the possibility of leaking their results through a side
channel.
In practice, web browsers achieve it by reducing the reso-
lution of timers [42], disabling shared memory or by using
site isolation [34]. However, these techniques prevent only
cross-site attacks, and do not work at the presence of a local
attacker.
The most common target for side-channel attacks is CPU
caches, and many of the practical attacks can be prevented by
defending this target. There is an extensive body of research
in the direction of preventing side channel attacks, ranging
from cache isolation [39], to attack detection [19], enforcing
non-interrupted execution [32,41], and cache coloring [37].
Yet, they provide only a partial defence as transient execution
attacks may use other side-channel targets too [35].
Finally, an isolated execution environment can be achieved
with a specialized microkernel [16], but it requires a complete
redesign of the system.
9 Conclusion
We presented a technique to make speculative execution
vulnerabilities visible by simulating them in software. We
demonstrated the technique by implementing a Bounds Check
Bypass detection tool called SpecFuzz. During the evaluation,
the tool has proven to be more effective at finding vulnera-
bilities than the available static analysis tools (in total, 2055
found by SpecFuzz, whereas RH Scanner found 38).
At the same time, the additional dynamic information we
get from SpecFuzz has shown us that realistic BCB vulnera-
bilities are much less common than we initially anticipated.
Among the tested libraries, SpecFuzz found only 10 realis-
tically exploitable BCB vulnerabilities. To make use of this
observation, we developed a simple analysis heuristic that al-
lowed us to automatically filter out the low-risk vulnerabilities.
Thanks to it, the performance cost of SpecFuzz-based patches
was considerably lower (at most 12%) compared to the slow-
down caused by conservative defences such as Speculative
Load Hardening (80% on average).
References
[1] Checkpoint/Restore In Userspace. . http://criu.org/. Accessed:
May, 2019.
[2] Speculative Load Hardening: A Spectre Variant 1 Mitiga-
tion Technique . https://docs.google.com/document/d/
1wwcfv3UV9ZnZVcGiGuoITT_61e_Ko3TmoCS3uXLcJR0/edit#
heading=h.phdehs44eom6, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[3] SUSE Security update for kernel-firmware. https:
//www.suse.com/de-de/support/update/announcement/2018/
suse-su-20180008-1/, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[4] BearSSL . https://bearssl.org/, 2019. Accessed: May, 2019.
[5] Brotli . https://brotli.org/, 2019. Accessed: May, 2019.
[6] JSMN . https://github.com/zserge/jsmn, 2019. Accessed: May,
2019.
[7] LibHTP . https://github.com/OISF/libhtp, 2019. Accessed:
May, 2019.
[8] libyaml . https://pyyaml.org/wiki/LibYAML, 2019. Accessed:
May, 2019.
[9] Honggfuzz. http://honggfuzz.com/, 2019. Accessed: May, 2019.
[10] libtomcrypt. https://www.libtom.net/, 2019. Accessed: May,
2019.
[11] Intel Corp . Analysis of Speculative Execution Side Channels . White
Paper, 2018.
[12] Intel Corp . Speculative execution side channel mitigations. White
Paper, 2018.
[13] Intel Corporation . Intel R© 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software
Developer’s Manual . 2018.
[14] Jo Van Bulck, Marina Minkin, Ofir Weisse, Daniel Genkin, Baris
Kasikci, Frank Piessens, Mark Silberstein, Thomas F Wenisch, Yuval
Yarom, and Raoul Strackx. FORESHADOW: Extracting the Keys to
the Intel SGX Kingdom with Transient Out-of-Order Execution . In
Usenix Security, 2018.
[15] Nick Clifton. SPECTRE Variant 1 scanning tool . https:
//access.redhat.com/blogs/766093/posts/3510331, 2018. Ac-
cessed: May, 2019.
[16] Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Tom Chothia, and Gernot Heiser. Time pro-
tection: the missing os abstraction. In Proceedings of the EuroSys
Conference, 2019.
[17] Google. More details about mitigations for the cpu speculative execu-
tion issue. https://security.googleblog.com/2018/01/more-
details-about-mitigations-for-cpu_4.html, 2018. Accessed:
May, 2019.
[18] Project Zero Google. Speculative Execution, Variant 4: Speculative
Store Bypass . https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/
issues/detail?id=1528, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[19] Daniel Gruss, Julian Lettner, Felix Schuster, Olga Ohrimenko, Istvan
Haller, and Manuel Costa. Strong and Efficient Cache Side-Channel
Protection using Hardware Transactional Memory . In Usenix Security,
2017.
[20] Noam Hadad and Jonathan Afek. Overcoming (some) Spectre
browser mitigations . https://alephsecurity.com/2018/06/26/
spectre-browser-query-cache/, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[21] Open Source Security Inc. Respectre: The State of the Art in Spectre
Defenses . https://www.grsecurity.net/respectre_announce.
php, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[22] Reinders James. Intel Process Trace . https://software.intel.
com/en-us/blogs/2013/09/18/processor-tracing, 2013. Ac-
cessed: May, 2019.
[23] Paul Kocher. Spectre Mitigations in Microsoft’s
C/C++ Compiler . https://www.paulkocher.com/doc/
MicrosoftCompilerSpectreMitigation.html, 2018. Accessed:
May, 2019.
[24] Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Daniel Gruss, Werner Haas, Mike
Hamburg, Moritz Lipp, Stefan Mangard, Thomas Prescher, Michael
Schwarz, and Yuval Yarom. Spectre Attacks: Exploiting Speculative
Execution . arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.01203v1, 2018.
[25] Esmaeil Mohammadian Koruyeh, Khaled Khasawneh, Chengyu Song,
and Nael Abu-Ghazaleh. Spectre Returns! Speculation Attacks using
the Return Stack Buffer . 2018.
[26] Chris Lattner and Vikram Adve. LLVM: a compilation framework
for lifelong program analysis and transformation. In Proceedings of
the International Symposium on Code Generation and Optimization
(CGO), 2004.
12
[27] Moritz Lipp, Michael Schwarz, Daniel Gruss, Thomas Prescher,
Werner Haas, Stefan Mangard, Paul Kocher, Daniel Genkin, Yu-
val Yarom, and Mike Hamburg. Meltdown . arXiv preprint
arXiv:1801.01207, 2018.
[28] Chi-Keung Luk, Robert Cohn, Robert Muth, Harish Patil, Artur Klauser,
Geoff Lowney, Steven Wallace, Vijay Janapa Reddi, and Kim Hazel-
wood. PIN : building customized program analysis tools with dynamic
instrumentation. In ACM Sigplan Notices , 2005.
[29] Giorgi Maisuradze and Christian Rossow. ret2spec: Speculative
Execution Using Return Stack Buffers . In CCS, 2018.
[30] Microsoft. Msvc compiler reference: /qspectre. https:
//docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cpp/build/reference/
qspectre?view=vs-2019, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[31] Santosh Nagarakatte, Jianzhou Zhao, Milo M.K. Martin, and Steve
Zdancewic. SoftBound : Highly compatible and complete spatial
memory safety for C . In Proceedings of the 30th Conference on
Programming Language Design and Implementation (PLDI), 2009.
[32] Oleksii Oleksenko, Bohdan Trach, Robert Krahn, Andre Martin, Mark
Silberstein, and Christof Fetzer. Varys: Protecting SGX enclaves
from practical side-channel attacks. In USENIX Annual Technical
Conference ( USENIX ATC ), 2018.
[33] Oleksii Oleksenko, Bohdan Trach, Tobias Reiher, Mark Silberstein, and
Christof Fetzer. You Shall Not Bypass : Employing data dependencies
to prevent bounds check bypass. arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.08506,
2018.
[34] The Chromium Projects. Site Isolation . http://www.chromium.
org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation, 2018. Ac-
cessed: May, 2019.
[35] Michael Schwarz, Martin Schwarzl, Moritz Lipp, and Daniel Gruss.
Netspectre: Read arbitrary memory over network. 2018.
[36] Konstantin Serebryany, Derek Bruening, Alexander Potapenko, and
Dmitry Vyukov. AddressSanitizer: a fast address sanity checker. In
Proceedings of the 2012 Usenix ATC’12, 2012.
[37] Jicheng Shi, Xiang Song, Haibo Chen, and Binyu Zang. Limiting
cache-based side-channel in multi-tenant cloud using dynamic page
coloring. In International Conference on Dependable Systems and
Networks Workshops (DSN-W), 2011.
[38] Mark Silberstein, Oleksii Oleksenko, and Christof Fetzer. Speculating
about speculation: on the (lack of) security guarantees of spectre-v1
mitigations. https://www.sigarch.org/speculating-about-
speculation-on-the-lack-of-security-guarantees-of-
spectre-v1-mitigations/, 2018. Accessed: May, 2019.
[39] Read Sprabery, Konstantin Evchenko, Abhilash Raj, Rakesh B. Bobba,
Sibin Mohan, and Roy Campbell. Scheduling, Isolation, and Cache Al-
location: A Side-channel Defense . In IEEE International Conference
on Cloud Engineering, 2018.
[40] E. Tromer, D.A. Osvik, and A. Shamir. Efficient cache attacks on
AES , and countermeasures. Journal of Cryptology, 2010.
[41] Venkatanathan Varadarajan, Thomas Ristenpart, and Michael Swift.
Scheduler-based Defenses against Cross-VM Side-channels . In
USENIX Security Symposium , 2014.
[42] Luke Wagner. Mozilla Security Blog: Mitigations landing for
new class of timing attack | . https://blog.mozilla.org/
security/2018/01/03/mitigations-landing-new-class-
timing-attack/, 2018. Accessed: May, 2018.
[43] Guanhua Wang, Sudipta Chattopadhyay, Ivan Gotovchits, Tulika Mitra,
and Abhik Roychoudhury. oo7: Low-overhead Defense against
Spectre Attacks . 2018.
[44] Y. Yarom and K. Falkner. FLUSH+RELOAD : A high resolution, low
noise, L3 cache side-channel attack. In USENIX Security Symposium,
2014.
[45] Andreas Zeller, Rahul Gopinath, Marcel B ö hme, Gordon Fraser, and
Christian Holler. Generating software tests. In Generating Software
Tests. Saarland University, 2019. Accessed: May, 2019.
13
A Example of an Aggregated Trace
// Format: { Offending instruction :
[Mispredicted branches],
[Accessed addresses] }
{ Run1: {
0x440006 :
[0x531f14, 0x532b08],
[107820859003904,107820859004032,10782085900...],
0x470006 :
[0x531f14, 0x532074],
[107614700568644,107614700571668,10782085900...],
0x532836:
[0x53251f, 0x5326b5, 0x532ba9],
[5839584],
0x5424c1:
[0x5423a7, 0x542408],
[105690555219985,105690555219986,10569055521...],
0x542864:
[0x542683, 0x542743, 0x5427a9],
[105690555219985,105690555219986,10569055521...],
0x550007:
[0x531f14, 0x532074],
[107614700571612,107820859003940,10788957847...],
...},
Run2: {
0x440006 :
[0x531f14, 0x532074, 0x532b08],
[107820859003904,107820859004032,10782085900...]
0x532969:
[0x5326b5, 0x532774, 0x5327b0],
[107889578574388],
0x5329c1:
[0x5322b3, 0x5326b5, 0x532774],
[5839584],
0x5424c1:
[0x5423a7, 0x542408],
[105690555219986,105690555219987...],
0x542864:
[0x542683, 0x542743, 0x5427a9],
[105690555219985,105690555219987,105690555219988],
0x550007:
[0x531f14, 0x532074],
[107614700571612,107820859003940,107889578475616],
...},
...
}
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